

Regulating Social Membership: Immigration, Welfare and the Canadian State

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Introduction

As a settler society, Canada has depended on the arrival of newcomers to build the railways, farm the prairies, hew the forests, drive the wheels of industry and grow the markets for new goods and services. Immigrants have also contributed their ideas, beliefs, traditions, customs and experiences, which has made Canada a diverse and dynamic country. Today, with the declining birthrate, the government still seeks 250,000 immigrants a year to keep the economy growing and provide tax support for the welfare state.

While the state has depended on immigrants, it has always been wary of the social disruptions transnational migration causes. Thus it has endeavored, especially over the past century, to control who and how many people could enter and, once in, just what their membership privileges, rights and responsibilities would be. In this paper I theorize that the combination of laws, policies, measures and discourses enacted and applied, or what can be termed regulatory regimes, should be understood as a response to three main dilemmas, one socio-economic, one socio-cultural and one socio-political. The first dilemma is how to stream in the economic gains from migration in terms of tax revenues, capital investments and skilled labour while plugging up the holes that drain money from tax reservoirs into processing, resettlement, integration and security costs. The second is how to minimize the turbulence created when people with different modes of doing, knowing, representing and

being come to inhabit the same geographical and social spaces. The third is how to adhere to principles of democracy and social justice without these threatening social cohesiveness, order and the strength of the nation.

Of course framing governmental approaches in this way is not to suggest that regulatory bodies necessarily and explicitly see migration and settlement issues likewise. Rather it provides an instructive model with which to think about a country's policy goals and regimes as they relate to migrants and migration and as they change over time. Moreover, it highlights the fact that no single policy area or regulatory approach can sufficiently address the challenge of fostering an accommodating environment for established residents and newcomers alike. Likewise, a single government ministry cannot satisfactorily manage issues of immigration, and restrictive laws aimed primarily at controlling the movement of people have and will continue to fail as a policy response. Indeed, because of the three dilemmas, immigration poses particular difficulties for regulators and illustrates well the complexity and limitations of governance today.

As I shall argue, addressing these dilemmas is a highly complex affair. Migration is not an irrigation flow that can be simply turned off and on at the tap by opening and closing borders, and Canada is not an isolated island. The global movement of people surges and wanes, twists and turns, trickles and rages in response to the prevailing and shifting transnational economic winds, political currents, cultural waves and social topography. To begin with, there are many pressures on governments to attract or at least permit migrants. These include the needs of industry, the desire of landowners, international responsibilities regarding refugees, specific nation building goals, historical obligations, and the demands of ethnocultural, religious and humanitarian organizations. There are also forces that encourage people to uproot and

resettle legally or if necessarily illegally elsewhere. War, poverty, political and religious persecutions, environmental disasters, family ties or just better economic opportunities abroad are some examples. Taking all of these into consideration when determining immigration policy and numbers is a formidable task. It is also a challenge to calm the fears of the citizenry. The immediate presence of newcomers, some with different colours, customs and tongues, induces a greater emotional response than the incoming currents of goods, money, images and technologies, even though these may have a greater impact on daily life. There are fears about the loss of social cohesion, the breakdown of traditions and the polluting of the genetic stream. Workers worry, too, about an increase in competition for limited numbers of jobs and how this will affect the price of labour. Homebuyers and homeowners express concern about what immigration will do to real estate prices. Taxpayers vex about increasing processing and resettlement costs and welfare payments. And the press alarms everyone about 'foreign' criminals and political agitators. Finally, policy formulations must include broader concerns beyond just questions of who, how many, where and to what aims. Government decisions and actions markedly impact on the membership conditions, life chances and the well-being of immigrants, domestic workers, itinerant migrants and refugees, so there are high stakes involved. The lives of migrants are, to a great extent, at the mercy of the 'host' society and its governments. These institutions control who can or cannot enter a country, become a citizen, vote, run for public office and help make laws, earn a living, own property, rent an apartment, practice ethnic traditions, worship in public, use social services and receive welfare benefits, among other aspects of daily life.

Considering all that is involved, it is of little wonder in a world on the move that questions of migration are so perplexing and appropriate measures

so hard to formulate. Nor is it surprising that for most welfare states this is a volatile and shifting policy terrain. In facing these dilemmas, welfare states have various means at hand. These include the enactment and enforcement of laws and regulations, the application of government funding and subsidies, the creation of advisory groups, the direct provision of benefits and services, tax incentives, promotional campaigns, the distribution of information, public education as well as official discourse. They can operate at various administrative and geographical levels and can regulate directly, in partnership with non-governmental bodies or private enterprise. But whatever the arrangement they adopt, they must also take into consideration changing conditional parameters that can curtail the use of preferred measures or add enormous complexity to decision making. Some parameters are the constitutional framework, global and local economic conditions, citizen group or special interest lobbies, oppositional and alternative discourses, international relations, demographic conditions, technological developments and the degree of political support for a government and its policy objectives.

While I would argue that liberal democratic nations face similar dilemmas regarding migration, because of all the specific contingencies, how exactly each tries to resolve these varies in place and over time. And it is only in the study of a local landscape that a more textured picture can be woven as part of a comprehensive tapestry. Towards this I would like to begin to outline how the state of Canada has faced our three dilemmas, especially over the past four decades, a time when several new and important parameters have come to impact directly and indirectly on migration issues. During this period Canada has seen the entrenchment of human rights in the constitution, a further ethnic diversification of the population, the increasing political influence of ethnocultural groups and organizations, the deepening global integration of the

economy, advances in information and communication networks and the growth of social welfare institutions. These changes have had profound implications for Canada's social landscape and the conditions of migrants. They have also in many ways deepened and complicated the three dilemmas while at the same time placing serious restrictions on what state bodies are able or willing to do.

Though all changes and influences deserve greater scholarly attention, especially their relational effects, such a study is beyond the scope of this paper. Here I wish to highlight the interweave of social welfare with immigration. In terms of immigration studies, this area has received less attention in the literature, which gives greater play to demographic, economic, ethnographic and judiciary enquiry. But welfare has and is an important part of regulating immigration and, more broadly, social membership. And the Canadian state has applied and denied it in various ways as it has tried to reckon with the three dilemmas over the past century. We will look at some of this earlier history below. Of recent, the pressure to reduce social welfare funding at a time of government cutbacks, contracting out and political devolution has greatly affected the organizational structure of and funding flow among agencies involved in providing immigrant and refugee welfare support and services. Immigration policy has also taken a different path. Notably, it has been directed away from more social justice and humanitarian objectives towards marketplace aims. This, of course, has raised concern among immigrant advocacy groups, service providers, social workers and humanitarian organizations. However, the perception in much of the general population in this era of neo-liberalism is that the wrong kinds of immigrants (those lacking technical skills, high education or investment dollars) as well as inshore refugee claimants (people who arrive at the border and apply for

refugee status) are a welfare burden on the country and a threat to labour during a time of chronic unemployment.¹ In part this attitude stems from the way immigration throughout much of Canadian history has been framed as an economic tool and migrants as a labour input. In the past, following a 'tap on tap off' approach, immigration levels were reduced when employment prospects dried up so as not to burden social support systems or threaten public order, and people wonder why this is not happening today. It also stems from Canada's often uncomfortable relationship with publicly funded welfare programmes. While social programmes such as health and public education are now taken for granted by all as citizenship entitlements, others like child benefits and income assistance are heavily stigmatized and means-testing is a prerequisite. The notion persists that those who do not work and look after themselves and their family must be lazy. Opposition to migration stems as well from fear among members of the dominant ethnocultural groups that somehow their hegemony is threatened by all the differently cultured and coloured others who now make Canada their home.

What many fail to acknowledge sufficiently is that migration also has important cultural, social and humanitarian dimensions, in addition to short and long-term economic ones. How a country treats newcomers within and strangers without goes to the very heart of how accepting and just the nation-state is and whether it is a responsible member of the greater international community. Moreover, the degree to which someone can become a full social member will greatly influence the process of human becoming. Even in economic analyses it is well recognized that there are externalities that the marketplace cannot arbitrate. Many migrants, for instance, face a steeper workplace entry curve because of language, cultural, racial and legal barriers, education and skill hurdles and professional or trade certification problems

(Prefontaine & Benson, 1999). Immigrants may also experience emotional stresses associated with resettling in an unfamiliar place and refugees may suffer traumas from their experiences back home.

It is fine for the government to proudly promote Canada's multicultural heritage and point to immigrant success stories, but the reality is that many of Canada's immigrants have needed support to become participatory and contributing members, whether from an ethnocultural community, voluntary organizations, family or public agencies. This support, though, has not always been readily available, especially from government institutions. The opposite has in fact been more the norm. Obstacles have been put in the way of social inclusion, recognition and participation and it has been a long uphill struggle for newcomers to Canada to gain greater citizenship rights and receive public assistance to ease the burden of resettlement and integration.² But in its present approach, as we will see, the government of Canada seems once again intent on resolving the socio-economic dilemma to the detriment of social justice aims. If this is true, then one must wonder if ghosts from Canada's harsh exclusionary and oppressive past have not come back to haunt the present. What impact the narrow pursuit of economic growth will have on efforts to resolve the socio-political and socio-cultural dilemmas is hard to assess, though there are signs that ethnic intolerance is on the rise.³ To provide some perspective on all this and the discussion that follows, it is useful at this point to briefly review the history of earlier regulatory regimes of immigration and look at the influences these both had on and received from social welfare at the time. Indeed, in this we can find the seeds for many of the issues that ground today's policy initiatives and debates.

II: Social Welfare as a Limitation


For much of Canadian history, especially before the creation of extensive public health & welfare schemes beginning in the 1940's, and even right up until the direct funding of settlement service organizations in the late 60's, when in time of need immigrants have had to rely mainly on themselves, on mutual aid networks, on their ethnocultural community organizations or on volunteer organizations.

In the early decades of the 19th century, an influx of poor immigrants from Europe spurred the creation of many charitable religious and cultural organizations or 'benevolent societies' to help sick and desperate peoples (Lautenschlager, 1999:7). Then as immigration surged at the end of the 1800's and in the early part of the 20th century, ethnocultural organization began to appear. Some were formed to help preserve a group's culture and language, but more often their purpose was to provide mutual aid. In the new country, there were no extended family or support network to look to for help if someone became ill or lost his job. Examples include a mutual aid society formed by Polish immigrants in Kitchener, Ontario in 1872, societies for Italians in Montreal and Toronto at the end of the century, the Hungarian Sick-Benefit Society in 1901 in Lethbridge, Alberta and Lithuanian mutual aid organizations in Toronto, Montreal and Winnipeg in the early 1900's (Lautenschlager, 1999:8). As these organizations developed and their communities became more integrated in society, they also took on the role of helping new immigrants to resettle and adjust. In particular, Lautenschlager notes that Chinese immigrants quickly formed voluntary associations after arriving in Canada, often based on kinship or district of origin. These associations ran hostels and co-operative boarding houses for transient railway workers and miners (1999:8). Adding to an absence of public welfare

systems at the time, discrimination against Chinese immigrants as well as Japanese and other Asian peoples enhanced the need for mutual aid organizations. Indeed, the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association of Victoria (CCBA) was formed in 1884 in part to advocate changes to discriminatory immigration laws and government policies (Con, et al., 1988). For instance, by 1875, four years after it had joined the Dominion of Canada, the province of British Columbia passed legislation prohibiting anyone of Chinese ethnicity from having the franchise and ordered the removal of all Chinese names from voting lists. That same year the Victoria City Council agreed that Chinese labourers should not be hired for public works projects, and the province followed suit in 1878. Shortly after that a head tax was imposed (ibid:46). The Benevolent Association was made up of volunteers and it also ran homes for the sick and the poor. As Lautenschlager notes, “it founded the first Chinese public school in Canada and the Jubilee Hospital, both in Victoria” (1999:9).

While these organizations provided important welfare services in lieu of sufficient state programmes, it would be wrong to assume they were driven only by altruism or were free from discriminatory practices. Con, et al., note that the CCBA was formed by wealthier merchants to help the growing number of unemployed and destitute men in the town and by so doing avoid recriminations from an increasingly anti-Chinese white population. The merchants were worried that further regulations would harm business prospects, especially at the gambling halls and opium dens (ibid:37). Ironically, part of the funding for CCBA activities was derived from gambling revenues (ibid:173). About one incidence of racism against Caribbean blacks, Calliste writes, “Except for the YWCA, which assisted some Jamaican domestics in the late 1920's, immigration societies did not provide social services for Caribbean

Figure 1. Immigration Levels, 1860 to 1997



Source: CIC

domestics as they did for British ones (1993-4:143).

As more migrants applied to come to Canada around the turn of the century (see Fig. 1), the federal government moved to end the era of relatively open entry and made residency a privilege granted by the state. Though immigrants were still sought as part of nation building plans, the federal and provincial governments established laws and policies to regulate immigration in line with economic needs, welfare limitations and racial ideology. Rather than assisting all newcomers, the government was setting a precedent for domination and subjectification based on physical and cultural attributes that would persist in official immigration policy until the 1960's and in other institutional frameworks and discourse even today. The Immigration Act of 1910 placed for the first time emphasis on an immigrant's place of origin. Through orders-in-council authority (decisions not debated in the two houses of parliament) the Cabinet was given the immediate power to deny entry to anyone belonging to any race deemed unsuited to the climate or requirements of Canada.

Writes Matas:

The Cabinet invoked this power on numerous occasions. On 14 March 1919 it passed an order-in-council prohibiting immigrants of the 'German, Austrian, Hungarian, Bulgarian or Turkish races' from immigrating to Canada.... In that same year, Cabinet used this power to prohibit the landing of Doukhobors, Hutterites, and Mennonites-groups deemed undesirable because of their 'peculiar customs' and assessed inability to become assimilated. Asians were prohibited from immigrating to Canada in 1923 (1996:93-4).

Financial requirements were also imposed, which effectively discriminated against poorer migrants and peoples of poorer countries, especially those from Asia (*ibid.*). The subsequent act of 1919 further increased the state's power to regulate who, when and how many by requiring that prospective immigrants hold a valid passport and pass a literacy test. It also made nationality, in addition to race, a factor and allowed authorities to restrict immigration depending on the particular socio-economic conditions in Canada (Green & Green, 1996: 8). Furthermore, in 1921 a new regulation required immigrants to have \$250 when they landed, though this requirement was dropped two years later for Europeans but not Asians. Other means of discouraging 'undesirables' were the establishment of a head tax and the continuous journey regulation (Matas, 1996).

We do find incidences where the government disregarded its own prejudiced regulations for economic benefit, but this is more a case of the exception proving the rule. Despite the general phobia about coloured and cultured others, when the need arose for a certain type of worker laws could be bypassed or altered. For instance, Japanese and Chinese were exempted from a \$200 entry requirement in 1914 for the dangerous job of building the Canadian National Railway, as were farm workers from eastern Europe from a

\$250 money qualification in 1921 (ibid.:95).

The depression years further exemplify this harsh policy environment. When unemployment and poverty devastated huge numbers of the population in the 30's, the government virtually closed the door to unskilled workers and vigorously enforced its policy of racial preference, allowing only those from Britain and the U.S. (See Fig. 1). But this did little to help the labouring masses that had earlier been recruited to plow the fields, chop down the forests and spin the wheels of industry. Again it was the ethnocultural and religious organizations that stepped in to help, though they too were financially pressed (Lautenschlager, 1999). Federal government unemployment relief was available but it was punitive and stigmatizing. A typical list* of regulations that a father had to comply with in 1931 bears this out. It states you should:

1. Prove that you are not able to support yourself and that no relative can help.
2. Be a man supporting a family.
3. Have been a resident of your municipality for at least 1 year before applying.
4. Turn in your liquor permit.
5. Turn in your automobile license plates and driver's license.
6. Remove telephones from your house.
7. Register at the unemployment office to show your willingness to work.
8. Work on municipal projects from time to time.
9. Allow relief office investigators to come to your home to check on these rules.

*Source: Federal Government Archives

Residency requirements made it even harder for recent immigrants to receive help. Camps were established where food, shelter and a small wage was exchanged for labour on public works projects, but these were comparable to prison-labour camps and conditions provoked riots. The municipal and provincial governments also provided meal tickets and cash payments, but as

with immigration laws, coloured migrants from the 'nonpreferred' and 'undesirable' classes were given less public assistance. In Alberta, Chinese were paid less than half the allowance of whites, which was insufficient to live on at the time. It was argued by the authorities that since Chinese care little about their living conditions more relief was unnecessary (Con, et al. 1988:182). Another method to reduce the welfare burden was repatriation. With the approval of China, the British Columbia government during 1934-5 went as far as to pay the passage back to China of sixty-five mental patients and several hundred destitute people (ibid.: 184). At least consent was sought at that time, unlike during the 1914-15 recession when 91 Caribbean domestics were deported in preference to increased welfare costs (Calliste, 1993-94:143).

If we think about the three dilemmas associated with human movement, they posed varying degrees of difficulties in the first half of the 20th century. The socio-economic dilemma was perhaps easier for regulators to address than at present. There were few public services for immigrants and most funds for resettlement and for welfare assistance during times of personal and family hardships or market failure were met by individuals, voluntary service organizations and the community, not government. On the other hand, the lack of a sufficient social safety net meant that downturns in the economy soon swelled the ranks of the homeless and forced people to beg out in the streets. This quickly threatened public order. It also deepened the socio-cultural dilemma as some workers and members of established ethnic groups vented their anger and racist beliefs at 'visible minorities'. Since the call for social justice and ethnic equality was still a voice in the distance, the government could impose strict limits on immigration levels and deny entrance to certain groups when necessary. But economic interests also

encouraged a more open policy to meet the demand for labour. So often regulators said one thing and did another, talking tough about keeping Canada white and Anglo while inviting settlers from eastern Europe and migrant labour from Asia (Green & Green, 1996). Still, in terms of immigration, the socio-political dilemma was not yet a significant concern. Where there was opposition to racial barriers, the government could apply oppressive means to regulate and order the changing social landscape and fear little public outrage.

III: Social Welfare as an Answer

The twenty years following the end of WWII were some of the quietest in Canadian history where migration is concerned. This resulted from a combination of factors. The first and most important was the booming economy, which helped newcomers establish themselves in jobs and kept the cost of resettlement to a minimum. We should remember that this not yet a time when “illegal immigration” posed a problem. Transportation costs were prohibitive and information about opportunities for work did not travel as quickly as today. But the state of the economy alone does not provide a complete explanation. The growth of social welfare offered the security sought in the wake of the depression. After the threat of mass political unrest during the 1930's, the federal government conceded that a permissive market approach, backed up with only municipal and voluntary welfare initiatives, was insufficient for a modern nation with all the social ills that industrialism, capitalism and urbanization wrought. Though the market was still suppose to answer most needs, citizens wanted a social welfare and social security system to assure them that a repeat of the depression would not occur. Towards this end, the federal government, with the agreement of the provinces, began to assemble the apparatus of the welfare state. Though most

programmes were not fully institutionalized until the 1970's, several were established in the post war years on a residual basis (Armitage, 1996). The government, reviews Myles, "passed unemployment insurance legislation in 1940, introduced universal family allowances in 1944, and in 1951 passed the Old Age Security Act that provided \$40 a month to all citizens age 70 or over" (1996:119). Immigrants who met residency and other specific programme requirements could receive benefits and this provided some security and lessened somewhat the difficulties of moving to a new country. Provisions were also made in the 1952 Immigration Act for a provincial-federal cost sharing programme to provide newcomers basic welfare and medical insurance in case of illness or accident for up to one year after arrival (Hawkins, 1988, p.110). This programme is still in place today. But as Hawkins notes, officials believed that immigrants should for the most part look after themselves, and it was not until the mid 1960's that restrictions on funding for resettlement and integration services eased, though at first only for language training programmes (ibid.:109-110).

A third factor, the racist immigration policy, although morally unjustifiable, also helped keep immigration from becoming a burning socio-cultural issue. Though the human rights discourse was starting to take hold, especially after the atrocities of Hitler's death camps, the federal government was not yet ready to cave into the pressure from humanitarian organizations or ethnic communities to end the discriminatory selection process. Then prime minister, Mackenzie King, made this clear in a speech in the House of Commons in 1947:

The policy of the government is to foster the growth of the population of Canada by the encouragement of immigration. The government will seek legislation, regulation and vigorous administration, to ensure the careful selection and

permanent settlement of such numbers of immigrants as can advantageously be absorbed in our national economy.... With regard to the selection of immigrants, much as been said about discrimination. I wish to make it quite clear that Canada is perfectly within her rights in selecting the persons whom we regard as desirable future citizens. It is not a "fundamental human right" of any alien to enter Canada. It is a privilege.... There will, I m sure, be general agreement with the view that the people of Canada do not wish, as a result of mass immigrations, to make a fundamental alteration in the character of our population.... Any considerable Oriental immigration would, moreover, be certain to give rise to social and economic problems of a character that might lead to serious difficulties in the field of international relations (cited in Reitz, 1987:129).

With no major change in the policy regime, King's government tried to ensure that immigration would be used strictly as an economic tool to manage the labour supply, with little fear that it would either greatly burden socio-cultural relations or drain public revenues. The reality, as in the earlier period, was slightly different. The employment needs for the expanding economy could not be met by the traditional source countries alone, so in response to pressure from the business lobby, the policy was shifted to accept immigrants from anywhere in Europe (Green & Green, 1996). As a result, many unskilled workers from southern Europe came to work in the resource based and construction industries. This marked the start of another shift in the demographic makeup of the country and a new period of ethnocultural relations.

The 1960's brought further change in this regard as a result of internal and external pressures. As Canada took on more international responsibilities, forged broader relations with countries in Asia and Africa and increased the demand for technically skilled worker in the manufacturing sector, it became apparent that the old insular and racist immigration policy had to give way. Canadian parliament, too, could no longer defend the policy against claims of

injustice and against blaring inconsistencies with the Act for the Recognition and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, passed in 1960 (Anderson, 1991:185). So in 1962 the government moved to introduce a new set of regulations which eliminated racial and religious criteria and based selection on individual qualifications and financial means of support, not country of origin. Furthermore, the new policy made sponsorship rights for dependents and for extended family members universal, and it extended them to both citizens and landed immigrants, irrelevant of the sponsor's place of birth. While the new measures did not guarantee a place for refugees, and would not until introduction of the 1978 Act, they did signify that migration was no longer strictly a domestic concern, as King had put forth.⁴ They also signified that from here on out it would be a much more complex process to regulate.

Though these changes were an important milestone along the road to creating a more socially just society, the inclusion of egalitarian objectives in immigration policy created several new problems that would first surface in the second half of the decade and persist in earnest thereafter. One was how to limit the number of unskilled dependents and sponsored relatives, who might become a strain on an expanding social welfare system. A second was how to integrate a multi-ethnic society to assure social order and avoid the race-riots that were occurring across the border. A third was how to help a more diverse population of newcomers settle and make their way in Canada.

A response to the first problem came in 1967 with the introduction of a point system to assess immigration applicants. Under this system the largest two groups, independents and nominated relatives (a new class for extended family members) would be assessed on an objective scale and awarded points for education, occupational demand, skill level, age, language and family ties.

As before, dependents and close relatives, who qualified under the family class, did not have to go through the point assessment system and were given priority. On the whole, the point system alone has had mediocre results in providing for appropriate numbers, and the government has had to frequently calibrate the point scale and criteria or has needed to bring in further restrictions during poor labour market conditions, such as requiring that immigrants have prearranged employment (Green & Green, 1996).

Solutions to the second problem have come under the scope of 'multiculturalism'. This is a complex mix of initiatives, services, programmes, and rhetoric, offered by ethnic organizations and councils, community groups, agencies at all levels of government and various third sector entities. An official federal Multiculturalism Policy was introduced in 1971 and the Secretary of State began funding ethnocultural groups, whose identities, they wished to affirm on a symbolic level. Subsequently, in the late 1980's, a Multiculturalism Act was passed and a federal Department of Multiculturalism established. Several provinces have since followed suit and brought in their own multiculturalism policies and related departments. It is beyond the discussion here to go into much detail, but suffice it to say that notable effort was made to reorder the social landscape in light of changing population dynamics. Just how successful these undertakings have been is a highly debatable issue. Some claim multiculturalism, or the idea that the cultural of no one ethnic group should predominate, has just drawn lines between ethnic groups, rather than bring them closer together, and this has created a country without an identity. On the other hand, some claim it has made Canada a more tolerant political community by raising awareness and promoting acceptance of cultural differences. Some feel it hasn't addressed sufficiently issues of access, equity, power and institutionalized racism. Another criticism is that it

has not substantially altered the French/English bilingual and bicultural character of the country and ethnic minorities remain Canada's others. Finally, there are claims that it is just a more complex form of racialization that reinforces artificial social categories, such as Asian or Black, which facilitate discrimination, injustice and inequality instead of questioning their validity. All of these arguments have merit, which attests more than anything to the difficulty of addressing the socio-cultural and socio-political dilemmas in Canada today.

If multiculturalism, particularly the 1988 Act, provides in some part a legal framework for ethnocultural group justice and equality, the types and availability of settlement and integration programmes and social services supply the critical support necessary for many immigrants and refugees to build a foundation in their new homeland. Indeed, the development of a vast and diverse network of non-governmental immigrant service agencies (ISA) has advanced in part the humanitarian and egalitarian aims of the Canadian welfare state. And in lieu of the slow pace of reform in 'mainstream' welfare organizations, ISAs have offered perhaps the best solution to the third problem. We can look in some detail at how this transpired and at the roles of various immigrant service organizations and the services they provide.

The impetus for many of the services and programmes came once again from the volunteer sector, especially within ethnocultural communities. As they had at the turn of the century and in the depression years, volunteer-based, non-profit organizations responded in the early 1970's to the needs of refugees and the more diverse and financially insecure groups of immigrants and refugees arriving in Canada. At first these organizations started out small with several volunteers, but as the demand for their services and funding sources increased, they expanded their staff and the range of services offered

(Beyene et al., 1996). Today there are more than a hundred ISAs in each of the three large metropolitan regions--Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. And there are many more organizations in smaller cities and towns across the country. These agencies and organizations take many shapes and sizes and are generally differentiated by the character of their client populations, by their overall goals and objectives, by the types of services they offer and by their organizational structure.

Beyene et al. (1996:172-3) mention four reasons for the growth of immigrant service agencies. One was the longer time frame for settlement than was assumed by the government. It was believed that the settlement period would only last 2-3 years, during which time publicly funded agencies would provide initial orientation services and language classes. Any need for assistance after that could be addressed by mainstream institutions (schools, hospitals, government welfare agencies, etc.). But in fact, as volunteer organizations began to realize, for Vietnamese and Latin American refugees and sponsored 'Family Class' immigrants, among others, the settlement process was far more lengthy and complex. A second reason was that the services offered by mainstream agencies were not adequate or culturally appropriate. Language barriers, racist policies and practices and a lack of understanding of the experiences faced by migrants were (and continue to be) a common problem. A third reason related to the second was that ISAs proved more flexible and rooted in the community. This meant they were able to offer linguistically and culturally appropriate services or new programmes when the need arose. Lastly, the rapid growth of ISAs in the 70's can be attributed to their ability to successfully procure funds from different levels of government, from fee-for-service programmes and from other funding organizations and foundations, such as the United Way of Canada. Other factors no doubt

contributed to the advancement of ISAs. This was a time when the federal government, under the leadership of the strong centralist prime minister, Pierre Trudeau, was expanding its regulatory domain as it attempted to gain control over a shifting social milieu. An increase in social welfare funding was one means to achieve this. The struggle for social justice was also finally bearing fruit. The rights of Canada's 'others' along with recent immigrants and refugees were finally being acknowledged and forming partnerships with non-governmental agencies was a common and effective way to show government commitment without expending too many resources. The ability of ISAs to successfully lobby for funds, however, can in large part be ascribed to their necessary and invaluable work.

The main role of most ISAs is the delivery of core services. These help immigrants adjust to their new life in Canada, utilize social resources, successfully enter the job market and participate in wider community affairs. These services are usually provided on a agency-client basis, which follows the market-oriented approach commonly found in much of the Canadian social welfare system. Many immigrant services adopt this model because of funding mandates and the immediate needs of newcomers.

But ISAs, to varying degrees, also carry out important community building and advocacy work. Since they usually derive their volunteers and support from ethno-cultural communities, it is critical that they help foster this network of relations. They do this by holding public forums, by distributing newsletters, by operating resource centers, by facilitating women's groups and by offering a venue and events for newcomers to meet and become acquainted (Beyene, et al.). Community leaders are developed through membership on an agency's board of directors, too (ibid.).

There is much debate about the appropriate role of ISAs. Should they be

servicing state, marketplace or community needs? Should they offer reactive or proactive services and how does this affect self and community empowerment? Should ISAs duplicate 'mainstream' service providers? Can ISAs maintain their own agenda and remain politically active if they are funded by the state? Do ISAs promote ethnic ghettoization or help strengthen community bonds? Do ISAs help deconstruct dominant socio-cultural patterns and representations or reinforce them?⁵

Mainstream welfare organizations were also rocked in the shifting currents of the late 1960's and 1970's. Both demographic and ideological changes during fluctuating economic conditions forced a reconsideration of the idea that common social services were sufficient for all. Hence they endeavored to move away from a uni-versity model of service organization to a poly-versity model (Minors, 1996) or from an assimilationist/excluding, monocultural approach to an including, multicultural approach (Tator, 1996). But research shows this has been a slow transition. Writes Tator in reviewing a 1987 study conducted by the Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, "While access to basic social and health-services is a universal entitlement, mainstream agencies across the human service delivery system have failed to provide accessible and equitable services. The researchers identified linguistic, cultural and racial barriers and an absence of strategies to address them" (Pp.153). Furthermore, a 1991 study by the Multicultural Coalition for Access to Family Services in Metro Toronto found, as Tator reports:

An 'appalling lack of services' in ten ethnocultural and racial-minority communities. Less than 8 percent of staff at established agencies speak a language other than English. Just 14 per cent of front-line staff are from the ten communities studied.... The study indicates that 62 per cent of the established

family-service agencies had no formal or informal policies or practices to address the concerns of ethnic and racial-minority communities in Metropolitan Toronto Communities (Pp. 161).

These and other studies of children's, women's and mental health services show that more symbolic change than structural change has occurred. Despite the rhetoric of multiculturalism and ethnocultural rights, discrimination persists in the way funds are allocated, in hiring practices, in job assignments, in programme aims, in the attitudes of welfare service workers and in the focus of training & education (*ibid.*). It is not always blatant. In fact it is often in the normalized routines of institutions that do not put in place a system of measures to promote equity and inclusion. Or it stems from the power evoked when the institutional relation is framed as authority figure and subject or state agent and dependent refugee, not person and person. The recent moves to devolution of responsibility from the federal to the provincial and municipal levels holds out some hope that established organizations can learn from ISAs and better respond to the legitimate needs of immigrants and refugees. But government cutbacks and privatization may limit innovation where it does not pay.

Indeed, since the late 80's the state has fashioned a new regulatory system that places neo-liberal economics and national unity ahead of ethnocultural equality and social equity, two of the important aims of the earlier framework. In part this new system arose out of the need to once again address seriously the three dilemmas of migration. The regulatory regime shaped from the reforms begun in the 1960's was part of a larger policy framework that help the state respond to rapidly changing demographics and the challenges this brought in an age of concern for human rights, social justice and ethnocultural equality. But two decades later the system could no

longer contain all the turbulence from the politics of identity and processes of economic globalization that were threatening to sink the government under the weight of debt and tear the social landscape asunder.

IV: Social Welfare as a Burden

Though one could debate just how far the Canadian welfare state had advanced the goal of social justice in the 1960's and 1970's,⁶ the answer for many members of the public, especially corporate elites and those in the dominant ethnocultural groups, was far enough. Rather, they felt the pendulum needed to swing back in the other direction if Canadians were to maintain their quality and way of life.⁷ For one, they argued, government intervention in market relations following a Keynesian Welfare State model was bloating the bureaucracy, running up deficits, increasing taxes and ultimately reducing Canada's global competitiveness and economic growth. This led to increased unemployment and welfare receipts. Furthermore, income redistribution programmes were fostering a sense of dependence in welfare recipients, which took away their desire to work. Echoing earlier times, they stressed that welfare needs should primarily be met through the market, the family and the community. They also criticized excessive government involvement in socio-cultural affairs. It seemed each time the government endeavored to bring the country closer together it moved it farther apart. Despite efforts to appease French Canada with the Official Languages Act and other assurances of cultural protection, Quebec refused to be a signatory to the 1982 Constitutional Act. The 1987 Meech Lake and the 1992 Charlottetown Accords were also rejected by Quebec or other provincial legislators and residents either for not going far enough in guaranteeing collective ethnocultural rights or for going too far.⁸ The official Policy of

Multiculturalism (1971) and the Multiculturalism Act (1988) were likewise denounced for creating divisions in the population by fostering ethnic group identity and solidarity rather than national unity and by legitimating the notion of collective cultural rights. Multicultural funding for ethnocultural organizations led directly to their growth in numbers and political influence, which has been blamed in part for the steady erosion of Canadian traditions. This has been a particular sweet spot for critics. Finally there was strong opposition to the regulatory system for immigrants and refugees. Though most Canadians agree that immigration is necessary for Canada, especially the positive economic benefits, they believed the system needed reform. It was letting in too many immigrants who, because of their lack of language and educational skills, required welfare services, who had difficulty adapting to Canadian culture, who brought their political agenda from their homeland with them or who were involved in criminal activities. And Canada's lax border security and generosity towards refugees is seen as an open invitation to all kinds of "illegal immigrants" and inshore refugee claimants.

The upshot of all this dissatisfaction has been an attempt in the late 80's and 90's to create a new regulatory regime for migration within the larger currents of government restructuring associated with economic globalization and Canadian nationalism. Earlier solutions, such as multiculturalism and increased social welfare programmes and funding, seen as an enabling means to integrate immigrants, resolve socio-cultural conflicts and meet humanitarian responsibilities were now cast as a burden to the new goals of national unity, economic competitiveness and social order. Of course it wouldn't be as simple as turning the clock back to the first few decades of the century, eliminating government welfare and closing the door on certain groups of migrants, though a salient and vocal element of the political right

does advocate this. There are still influential groups with varying social, economic, political and cultural agendas that must be appeased. Immigration indeed has evolved to become a multipurpose instrument of nation building, not simply an economic or social tool. This said, a whole series of recent moves by the federal and provincial governments have been clearly aimed at scaling back the costs and maximizing the economic benefits of immigration and transforming social membership towards desired ends. What are some of these changes?

As the discussion in previous sections has shown, one aspect of regulating migration, where welfare costs are at issue, is setting overall immigration levels, the number targets for each class and selection criteria for certain categories of immigrants. Here we find several significant changes in recent policy initiatives. These changes support the trend towards facilitating the freer movement of capital and its managers and the more restricted movement of less skilled labour.⁹

One has been a shift in proportions from family class to economic class. From the late 1960's to the mid 1980's, when humanitarian goals were emphasized, family class immigrants and refugees grew from 26% of total newcomers in 1968 to almost 70% by 1983 (Prefontaine & Benson, 1999:7). These two groups now make up just over 40% of the total. Findings show that because of language, cultural, racial and skill barriers they have had more difficulty entering the job market and have required more social services (ibid.). Reducing this number allows for a stricter assessment of financial security or employability, especially since family class immigrants can enter under sponsorship and do not have to meet new stricter skill requirements. At the same time, eligibility criteria for family sponsorship have been tightened to minimize defaults and the need for social assistance. Furthermore, the

government is proposing to improve enforcement mechanisms and to eliminate the opportunity for sponsors to appeal when denial is based on financial ineligibility. Green and Green (1996:39) suggest these changes in essence amount to a loss of sponsorship rights.

Another important change concerns economic class assessment. To meet the goal of creating a highly flexible and innovative workforce, applicants are to be assessed on their 'transferable skill sets' and educational attainment rather than, as in the past, on specific job qualifications. Age, English or French language ability, knowledge of Canada, a job offer and motivation are also selection criteria. This change will likely reduce the job entry and retraining costs, some of which are born by government through language programmes and employment insurance benefits. More importantly, the intent is attract people who will create jobs and help the economy grow. The new policy will also make it easier for 'highly skilled' temporary workers and their dependents to enter Canada as long as they have a job posting. Until now employers had to prove they tried to hire or train Canadian workers. This requirement will be relaxed in sectors where employment training is taking place but short-term needs cannot be met. Spouses would also be allowed to accept job offers once in Canada.

Refugee claimants also require substantial public resources while they wait for the Refugee Board to hear their claim and determine if they are 'genuine' refugees based on the definition in the Geneva Convention. The government, while 'upholding Canada's humanitarian tradition,' plans to introduce better assessment procedures.¹⁰ Because inland claimants can work or receive social assistance while they wait for processing, sometimes for up to three years, the government is proposing to streamline and speed up the decision making process to assure 'fairness but efficiency'. This change is

particularly targeted at undocumented claimants: people who arrive in Canada without a passport or identification, and so called economic migrants: people who want to improve their lives but cannot meet economic class assessment criteria and thus claim refugee status.

The restructuring, deficit reduction and privatization agenda has also affected the amount, type and administration of funding for immigrant service agencies (see Fig. 2). Devolution has an exceptionally strong impact. An example is the new partnership agreements between the federal and provincial governments. Under the terms of these agreements, funding and responsibility for immigrant settlement programmes are passed to the provinces through a process begun in 1995 called 'settlement renewal' (Creese, 1998). In exchange, the provinces will be more directly involved in recruiting and selecting skilled workers through a nominee process. 'Settlement renewal' is part of the larger effort to devolve many social programmes to the provinces, municipalities and to non-government organizations.

Ideally, the potential for greater community based initiatives and input exists when there is local control, but this will depend on the political priorities of each provincial government. As it stands, provincial governments are also under the same global pressure to reduce costs and have subsequently devolved programmes to the municipal level, where there are likewise budget strains (Owen, 1999). So the reality at the moment is far from what might be achieved. In the shake up, what occurs is that funding for some programmes is cut while new funding becomes available, though the overall trend is towards shrinking budgets. Writes Creese about the effects of this change, "there is quite simply, less money available for many programs, including those providing core services related to long-standing community

needs such as bilingual counsellors and employment programs” (1998:8). Agencies may receive only enough funding to employ workers on a part-time basis or a salary may come from two or more funding sources. Since many programmes are now funded on the short-term, reapplying to multiple funding sources adds greatly to the administrative load. Creese does note that new opportunities have opened up, especially for larger agencies, but sometimes this can be to the detriment of immigrants. An example is providing ‘mainstream’ job-training services for unemployed workers through a new employment insurance (EI) programme. The drawback is that immigrants who have just arrived and not built up enough weeks of work to meet EI criteria cannot participate. The catch is that the federal department that now funds the EI programme eliminated a universal training programme that serviced immigrants and provided core funding for many agencies (Whittleton, 1999).

Through processes of devolution, the non-government sector overall is increasingly playing a more active role in the delivery of government programmes. This includes non-profit ISAs. But as agencies come to do the state's bidding, the nature of their relationship with government and their organizational structure is being transformed. To recall the discussion above, in the 1970s the federal government began funding ISAs that had sprung up to meet the needs of a more diverse group of newcomers. This usually occurred after the agency piloted a programme or service, found that voluntary help alone was insufficient and sought out financial support, much of it from the public purse. As agencies became more dependent on government funding, there were fears, some well founded, that agencies might become pliant to the wishes of government and would no longer perform their advocacy and community development roles. But usually the consistency and security of what was often core funding allowed agencies to hire permanent staff, meet

necessary operational and administrative requirements, carry out their various roles and still provide crucial services for immigrant and refugee populations. The practical demands meant that some co-optation was unavoidable. Today, however, privatization during a time of cutbacks is threatening the very character of these organizations and their ability to respond to community needs. Agencies, who have lost core funding as programmes have been cut, now must compete for short-term, programme based funding for services the government deems necessary. Owen describes what is transpiring:

Many services previously delivered by government are now contracted out through a competitive bidding process. This has the effect, at least in the short term, of driving down the cost of programmes, and of eliminating those service providers who cannot meet the often very strenuous demands of the tendering process. The timeframes are often very short, and there are increasing requirements to prove organizational capacity, and not only the project's creativity or ability to address a community need (1999:6).

If we consider that many of today's larger agencies developed from grass-root collectives helping emerging ethnic communities, the loss of funding for smaller organizations could be devastating for new populations of refugees and immigrants that have no established community to assist them. It is too early to tell if provincial, municipal or foundation funding will provide a more secure substitute.¹¹

Another demand on the part of government fiscal managers is to show that their money is properly and well spent. To do this, new accountability rules have been introduced that require agencies to submit more detailed financial reports. For small agencies this can be a great burden on staff time, particularly if funding is coming from numerous sources and each requires a

statement. Furthermore, programmes are more closely evaluated for their effectiveness. This assures that limited resources are not diverted away from valuable services into less rewarding ones. The problem is how to measure service quality. The likelihood is that programmes which lead to job placements, a quantifiable result, will be more highly valued than counselling, a more qualitative activity. Indeed this is already evident in the choice of programmes for funding cuts. A second problem is that to show a programme's effectiveness, applicants with higher potential, for example to be hired after a job training programme, will be chosen over those people perhaps most in need (Whittleton, 1999).

How far privatization will proceed is difficult to predict. The more non-profit agencies are required to behave like business to meet the demands of a neo-liberal agenda, the greater likelihood they will drift away from their community mooring into the depth of competition. Here they may find that private business with greater resources and economies of scale could drain away funding and leave them high and dry. On the other hand, if they can join together to resist becoming an agent of the government regulatory system and of private industry, if they can reassert the roles of advocacy and community development towards the goal of social justice for immigrants and refugees, then perhaps they can create a new relationship with regulators, where they are able to, as Creese (1998) puts it, 'bite the hand that feeds them'. In fact, this appears to be happening to some extent in the big cities where many ISAs are struggling to survive. Coalitions among ISAs and other grass-root community groups are forming on important social issues to advocate changes in the direction of policy. One example is the Working Group on Poverty in Vancouver. The objectives of this group are affordable housing, food security, equal access to employment and language training, changing

government policies that create barriers and advocating for social justice for immigrants and refugees (ibid.:30). Working together allows advocacy groups to share resources, put a stronger voice forward and seek some protection in numbers. The question remains, will regulators bite back as they struggle to address the dilemmas of migrations at a time of capital and political restructuring.

The ideological shift has also brought about major changes in mainstream welfare programmes. This has not boded well for disadvantaged groups.¹² The notion that welfare is an entitlement of social membership has been replaced with the older idea that it is a last means of support for market failure or the antiquated view that it is a punitive hand-out that should discipline indolent labour. Towards this end, universal welfare programmes and tax deductions, such as Old Age Security, Family Allowance and the Child Tax Deduction have been dropped in favour of programmes with means testing, such as the Child Tax Benefit and the Guaranteed Income Supplement (for the elderly). Contributions for the Unemployment Insurance programme (now Employment Insurance) were entirely transferred to employers and employees and the required number of weeks of work before eligibility was increased. Contribution systems are, by definition, biased against recent arrivals, whom have not paid in long enough to qualify. The narrowing of eligibility only adds to this. In the case of several provinces, including Ontario and British Columbia where many immigrants resettle, income assistance programmes for those able to work but unable or unwilling to find jobs have become far more stringent. Income and asset tests are applied and to receive payments the 'client' must be looking for work, attending a job training programme or, in the case of Ontario, must work in 'community' services.¹³ In British Columbia, recipients of B.C. Benefits, must take any job that pays more than

the welfare payment. Since income assistance rates are already near or below the poverty line, in an economy with high unemployment and few opportunities for better paying jobs (after industrial hollowing out and investment in technology has eliminated many higher paying union jobs) the only alternative are minimum wage service sector jobs. All of these changes of course impact hardest on more marginalized and disadvantaged groups, who are also least able to mount opposition. Coupled with reductions in programmes offered by ISAs, immigrants and refugees now face greater systemic barriers to inclusion and participation with fewer means to overcome them.

Social welfare funding in Canada, as mentioned in the previous section, has been directed towards programmes that advance the acceptance and appreciation of ethnocultural diversity and ensure the participation of ethnocultural communities. The federal policy of multiculturalism, with its associated programmes and subsidies, has been one of the main vehicles for achieving this. In the recent shift in direction, it too has been the target of cutbacks and restructuring. Some of the first changes occurred in the late 1980's. No sooner was the Multiculturalism Act (1988) passed and a federal department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship created in 1989 when the Conservative government at the time began reducing the budget for ethnocultural community and advocacy organizations. These organizations had been crucial in representing less established immigrants and pushing for greater social justice, including the Multiculturalism legislation. The budget was likewise reduced for the Heritage Languages Supplementary School Program Programme, which funded instruction in numerous languages. (Pal, 1995). In 1992, along with other government organizations, the Employment and Immigration Advisory Council was disbanded. Then in 1993, the

Secretary of State department, which had funded many ethnocultural organizations in the 1970's and 1980's was eliminated. The effect was to further reduce the power of advocacy groups.¹⁴ The focus of policy also shifted from recognizing and reinforcing the importance of ethnocultural communities in the Canadian polity to creating better race relations. This meant funds were directed at teaching dominant groups to tolerate minority groups rather than helping to end relations of power and privilege.

More weighty measures were taken when the Liberal party was elected in 1993. The Ministry of Multiculturalism was reduced to a directorate and folded into the new Department of Canadian Heritage. If we look at the objectives of this department--to enhance pride in Canada and to protect Canada's heritage--and considers its scope of responsibilities, such as the arts, broadcasting, athletics, cultural industries, youth exchange and national parks, along with multiculturalism and bilingualism policy, it becomes clear there is a direct attempt here to foster Canadian nationalism and to blunt the divisive issues of ethnic identity and the rights of minority groups. The concept of culture as performance, art, tradition and commodity is to replace the notion of culture as reproduced and altered patterns of meaning, lived experience and social interaction, which includes systems of discrimination, injustice and inequity as well as art, custom and material form. Furthermore, these attempts to counter the politics of identity and decrease the power of advocacy and community groups by dismantling social welfare support tie in with the overall move by the Canadian state to refashion social membership along market lines. This is part, argue Jensen & Phillips(1996), of a new citizenship regime, where the socially entangled citizen becomes a "client", advocacy groups become "providers", funding becomes a "contract" and community building becomes a "service".

In this new corporate culture, migrants, too, are redefined. They are either agents of economic growth or part of the welfare burden. The new regulatory framework put in place to address the dilemmas of migration today makes it clear that at this point in Canadian history there is no room for passengers that carry too much cultural baggage and cannot easily pay their own way. This approach unburdens the state of the socio-economic costs of migration by reducing welfare payments, at least in the short run. But just how long can the government dismiss calls for social justice before mounting inequity and inequality lead to political protest and social unrest? Empowering market players and disempowering and delegitimizing advocacy and community groups might reduce opposition to further deregulations and welfare cut-backs. But it may very well backfire and create more social havoc not less. Capitalism is after all by its very nature a creative-destructive and fluid process against which social institutions offer some protection, especially for those who cannot swim with the rapid currents of change. As for socio-cultural relations, the government's strategy is to promote rugged individualism combined with civic nationalism. But it seems unlikely to succeed in an age where ethnic-based collectivity challenges political association around the world and even influences marketing strategies. Quebec statehood and Aboriginal self-government movements are but two local examples. One has to wonder if a decade or so removed from now people will not look back fondly on the policy of multiculturalism, even with all its faults. At least it helped reorder and affirm a shifting social landscape even if it raised social welfare costs.

V. Conclusion

The problem for the Canadian state over its history and particularly in the past forty years, with the inroads made by social justice and rights movements, is how to address one dilemma related to migration without deepening another. I have asserted here that social welfare has been an integral part of efforts to find the right regulatory balance, tipping the scale as both a limitation and an answer. As the welfare state grew, the Canadian state finally in the late 1960's and the decade of the 1970's began, through various programmes and funding for immigrant and refugee settlement and integration, to address immigration not only as an economic tool but as a humanitarian and social responsibility. This gave hope to those groups struggling to remove the many barriers which were stopping immigrants and refugees from fully participating in processes of personal and social betterment.

Government steps since the mid 1980's to deregulate the movement of capital and to revise immigration and other social policies to do the bidding of transnational corporations and global investment houses have not boded well for disadvantaged and marginalized groups. Ironically, while capital has been allowed to flow freer, the state has begun to place stricter controls on the physical movement of poorer migrants. Cut-backs to social programmes also limit their economic and social mobility. The hope is that an expanding economy will provide enough employment to keep social discord to a minimum. But at the same time, such an economy will attract 'illegal' migrants and refugee claimants looking for work, who are desperate enough to endure poor conditions in the low-wage service sector or in sweat shops that have reappeared in large urban centres. Stronger border security will reduce but not stop the flow, and the cost of prevention and detention is high.

Providing social welfare during the first few years of integration may eventually seem like a better option. Additionally, it is hard to predict what effect the presence of many differently coloured and cultured others will have on socio-cultural relations, especially if they are abandoned on the margins of society and left to their own fate. Whichever approach the state adopts next as global/local conditions change, one thing seems sure: the dilemmas of migration will continue to challenge regulators and social welfare will be central to any new regime as both a limitation and possibility.

Notes

1. For a look at how Canadians broadly view immigration, see: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (1994) Immigration Consultations.
2. It should be noted that not all immigrants face the same economic hardships and social or racial discriminations. They are differently situated in class, gender, generational, health and ethnic relationships. In the research here I have considered more general patterns and have not described the distinct experiences of different groups. This is an important omission I need to rectify in future research.
3. For example, the number of cases of anti-Semitic vandalism and harassment increased over 200% between 1988 and 1994 (Mock, 1996). The number of cases of hate crimes in the courts have also increased. The several boatloads of Chinese refugee claimants that arrived on Canada's western shores in 1999 also provoked an anti-Chinese rhetoric in the public and media that has not been heard since the century's early decades.
4. Though there was no category for refugees, special exceptions were made for Hungarian refugees in the late 60's and Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees in the early 70's.
5. For more on these debates see: Ng (1988).
6. Changes to the constitution have advanced the legal rights of cultural minorities. But it is difficult to speak of a more equitable Canada. Writes Armitage (1996:62), "The National Council of Welfare indicates that 65.5 per cent of single immigrants who came to Canada after 1979 are in poverty (compared to a national average of 14.8 per cent).

7. See Cohen (1997) for an explanation of how the Canadian public was convinced that deficit reduction, privatization and welfare reform were necessary and inevitable.
8. For more on this, see, Kallen, E., (1995).
9. For a discussion on the ethical issues concerned with the movement of people and money from the perspective of different political philosophies see: Barry & Goodin (eds.) 1992.
10. There is no mention of reducing refugee numbers and 'upholding the tradition' would indicate no significant change in this regard. But from 1996 to 1998 there has been a 20% drop in numbers.
11. There are some positive moves taking place at the municipal level, where most newcomers resettle and where services are most necessary. For example, in Toronto in 1990, the Metro council established a new policy on Ethno-Racial Access to Metropolitan services and in 1994 a Policy Framework of the Settlement, Adaptation and Integration of immigrants and Refugees in Metropolitan Toronto was approved (Acting Executive Commissioner of Community and Neighbourhood Services, Brief to the Community and Neighbourhood Services Committee, Feb. 3, 1998. City of Toronto: Online document). Also, the province of British Columbia offers some funding through the Immigrant Settlement Program. In the 1997/98 period \$2.5 million was provided to agencies (Ministry Responsible for Multiculturalism and Immigration: Online Information). However, applications for \$4.7 million had been submitted, which indicates the present dearth of available funds.
12. For a detailed list of changes to the welfare system, see Cohen (1997).
13. These 'community services' are actually positions created within voluntary organization, make work projects or in the private sector. One criticism of this 'workfare' approach is that it forces the price of labour down by replacing higher paying jobs with workfare positions.
14. Ironically, at the same time that the Conservative government began efforts to limit the role of social and community advocacy groups, or what neo-liberals like to refer to as 'special interest' groups, the Business Council on National Issues (BCNI), made up of the largest corporations operating in Canada, was given a direct pipeline to the inner cabinet. For the story of how the BCNI has helped influenced public policy, economic and social, during both the Conservative and Liberal reigns in the past decade see, Clarke (1997).

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